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American Democracy and Governance in a  
Polarized Era
by Richard Barringer
 WE the PEOPLE of the United 
States, in order to form a more perfect 
Union, establish Justice, insure domestic 
Tranquility, provide for the common 
Defence,  promote the General Welfare, 
and secure the Blessings of Liberty to 
Ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain 
and establish this Constitution for the 
United States of America….  
—Preamble, US Constitution, 1787 
AND WHERE DO WE 
STAND TODAY?
Where do we stand today amid America’s sharply divided politics 
and governance? I argue here that in less 
than two and a half centuries since the 
nation’s founding, it has gone from the 
espousal of democracy and the general 
welfare to the pursuit of autocracy and 
corporatism. In the absence of funda-
mental reforms, America’s founding prin-
ciples and our national character are at 
risk.  
Robert Dahl, the most widely 
honored political scientist of the 20th 
century, observes in his classic treatise, 
On Democracy (2015), that Americans 
understand democracy largely in 
Madisonian terms, whereby various 
constitutional checks are held to be our 
essential safeguards against tyranny and 
autocracy.
After exhaustive study of democra-
cies, however, Dahl finds it preferable to 
think in terms of three types of democ-
racy, namely: 
• the Populist, characterized by 
apparent majority rule, while 
ignoring the observable fact of 
rule by a minority, wherein a 
minority with strong preferences 
may overrule a majority with weak 
preferences;
• the Pluralist, distinguished by 
peaceful coexistence among 
different interests and tolerance 
among separate values and goals 
(still, Dahl asks, how do we resolve 
conflicts along abiding fissures, 
such as race and gender?); and
• the Polyarchal, which stresses 
social rather than constitutional 
safeguards, encourages modera-
tion, and emphasizes a high rate 
of political activism and training 
in social norms to maximize 
consensus about their value and 
usefulness. 
Dahl argues that we have fallen too 
much under the spell of James Madison. 
To Dahl, the safety of democracy lies not 
in a complex network of constitutional 
checks and balances like the separation of 
powers, staggered terms, presidential veto, 
and judicial review; rather, it lies in the 
internalizing of restraints within the 
conscience, attitudes, and behavior of a 
nation’s citizens, who in the end consti-
tute democracy’s ultimate safeguard.      
John Adams, our second president, 
strongly rejected the illusions of the 
French Enlightenment that so enthralled 
Thomas Jefferson, the third president; 
namely,
• that the “People” are possessed of 
preternatural wisdom that guides 
their decisions; 
• that human beings are basically 
and profoundly rational creatures; 
and
• that American society is somehow 
immune to the ancient European 
hierarchical class divisions.
Mount Holyoke College historian 
Joseph Ellis (American Dialogue, 2018)
explains Adams’s belief that all societies 
inevitably produce social and economic 
elites that, left unchecked, achieve polit-
ical domination at the expense of everyone 
else. Only a strong executive branch is 
able to provide the balance and stability 
required for a large, continental republic. 
Adams advocated that all aristocracies 
must be controlled to protect democracy 
and the marketplace regulated to avoid its 
inherent and abiding excesses.
Ellis argues that from the 1930s 
through the late 1970s, Adams’s insight 
and wisdom prevailed in the United 
States, and that a Grand Bargain was 
forged from the New Deal of FDR to the 
Great Society of LBJ. Free-market regula-
tion was enacted to meet the egalitarian 
expectations of democracy, and social 
programs were designed to distribute the 
nation’s increasing wealth and power 
more equitably. 
Since the late 1970s and 1980s, 
however, this Grand Bargain has been 
abandoned. The diamond-shaped income 
distribution of the Grand Bargain has 
morphed into the old, aristocratic 
European triangle, with exceedingly few 
at the top of the income and power distri-
bution, and very many at the bottom. To 
achieve this, the prevailing New Right 
required a massive dose of amnesia, as 
well as a radically revisionist view of 
history. 
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Ellis observes that today’s debate 
about the federal role in society is a 
central feature of the ongoing American 
dialogue, as it has been from the very 
beginning, in the bitter argument between 
Jefferson’s Republicans and Alexander 
Hamilton’s Federalists. Today, however, 
“the rising tide lifts only yachts. The 
growing disparity of wealth is undeniable, 
as the values of capitalism trump those of 
democracy” (Ellis 2018: 104–105).
In Time Magazine of September 
14, 2020, authors Nick Hanauer and 
David Rolf explain, based on a new and 
groundbreaking analysis by the conserva-
tive Rand Corporation, that “the elephant 
in the room today is extreme income 
inequality; and just how big is this 
elephant? A staggering $50 trillion, in all!” 
(Hanauer and Rolf 2020). Had the more 
equitable income distributions of the 
three decades following World War II 
merely held steady, the aggregate income 
of Americans earning below the 90th 
percentile would have been $2.5 trillion 
higher in 2018 alone, enough to pay 
every working American in the bottom 
nine deciles an additional $1,144 a 
month, every month, every year! 
For three decades from the late 1940s 
to late 1970s, those at the bottom and 
middle of the distribution saw their 
incomes grow at about the same rate as 
those at the top. This was the era of the 
Grand Bargain, in which America built 
the world’s largest and most prosperous 
middle class, an era in which income 
inequality among income groups steadily 
shrank. 
Economics and policy are all about 
choice. This upward redistribution of 
income, wealth, and power was not a 
foregone conclusion; it was a choice, the 
direct result of policies we have chosen to 
implement since 1975. We chose to cut 
taxes on billionaires and to deregulate the 
financial industry. We chose to erode the 
minimum wage, the overtime threshold, 
and the bargaining power of labor.
“For four decades,” Hanauer and 
Rolf conclude, “we chose to elect political 
leaders who chose to put the material 
interests of the rich and powerful above 
those of the American people. We could 
choose to build a more equitable, resil-
ient, and prosperous America by choosing 
to include every American in it!”
In their American Amnesia, econo-
mists Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson 
(2016: 7–9) argue that all nations that 
achieved widespread affluence in the 20th 
century did so upon the catapult of the 
mixed economy. “It takes government—a 
good deal of it—to make advanced soci-
eties flourish for all.” The mixed economy, 
they assert, “may well be the greatest 
invention in all of human history, a spec-
tacularly positive-sum bargain. And now 
we’re trashing it!”
In a mixed economy, markets play 
the dominant role in producing and allo-
cating goods and services, and innovating 
to meet consumer demand. Government 
plays a vital and dominant role at the 
same time, when markets fall short or fail. 
Hacker and Pierson cite several great chal-
lenges facing the nation today, in which 
we once led and now trail other advanced 
nations, including
• public health and health care 
(United States ranks 17th)
• education (20th, where once we 
were the undisputed leader)
• income equality (most unequal 
among all advanced nations)
• research and development (9th)
• environment and climate change 
(33rd) 
• infrastructure investment (15th)
Hacker and Pierson offer no magic 
bullet to restore the nation’s pre-emi-
nence, but they do point to several critical 
needs: 
• to reform the political system to 
make it more majoritarian;
• to rebuild the capacity of govern-
ment, to make it work better;
• to empower the people by guaran-
teeing the right to vote, reducing 
the role of money in elections, and 
rebuilding labor unions; and
• to amplify the voices of the more 
moderate and progressive private 
corporations.  
In How Democracies Die (2018), 
political scientists Steven Levitsky and 
Daniel Ziblatt explain that, where it once 
was common, blatant military dictator-
ship has disappeared from much of today’s 
world. They find that democratic back-
sliding often begins at the ballot box. 
Today, unlike the more distant past, 
there is no single moment when democ-
racy gives way to authoritarian and dicta-
torial leaders; its erosion may be almost 
imperceptible. Abdication of their respon-
sibility by current political leadership 
generally marks a nation’s first step toward 
authoritarianism. Political parties and 
party leaders are democracy’s gatekeepers 
and defenders!
When fear and miscalculation lead 
established parties to bring extremists 
into the mainstream, democracy is imper-
iled. Institutions alone are not enough to 
reign in autocrats. Without robust norms 
of behavior, constitutional checks are not 
enough to safeguard democracy. 
Like Dahl, Levitsky and Ziblatt 
argue that democracies work best when 
constitutional mechanisms are reinforced 
by unwritten but accepted norms of 
behavior. In the United States, two such 
basic norms are mutual toleration and 
restraint in using institutional preroga-
tives (like the Senate filibuster, now used 
to excess). These norms are democracies 
guardrails, and they are weakening, espe-
cially from partisan polarization, and 
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morphing into a fixed battle over social 
issues of race, gender, and culture.
Levitsky and Ziblatt find four behav-
ioral signs of incipient authoritarianism: 
when a politician rejects the democratic 
rules of the game; denies the legitimacy of 
opponents; incites or encourages violence; 
and curtails the legitimate civil liberties of 
opponents.
SO, WHERE DO WE 
GO FROM HERE?  
In 2019, the American Academy of Arts & Science created a Commission on 
the Practice of Democratic Citizenship. 
The commission (including such notables 
as Judy Woodruff of PBS, David Brooks 
of the New York Times, and Norman 
Ornstein of the American Enterprise 
Institute) conducted 47 public listening 
sessions across America. 
At one such session in Bangor, 
Maine, the commission heard from a 
local woman who  responded to the ques-
tion, “What is our responsibility, living in 
a democracy?” “I think that’s a great ques-
tion,” she replied, “and I don’t know that 
I’ve ever been asked it before. I just 
wonder to what extent we all understand 
what a democracy is really all about.”  
In June 2020, the commission 
released its unanimous report, Our 
Common Purpose, with some 30 recom-
mendations “to better the Common 
Good.” It identifies several imperatives at 
the heart of our nation’s civic dilemma: to 
achieve equality of voice and representa-
tion, ensure the responsiveness of our 
political institutions, build a civic infra-
structure for shared purpose, and inspire 
commitment to democracy (AAAS 2020).
The commission sets forth several 
recommendations to address each imper-
ative, including 
• ranked choice voting in all federal 
and state elections,
• a constitutional amendment to 
regulate spending in elections,
• all federal elections to be held on 
the Veterans Day holiday,
• universal automatic voter registra-
tion,
• required voting in federal elec-
tions,
• new technologies for wider partic-
ipation in official meetings,
• universal expectation of at least 
one year of public service, and 
• civics education available for all 
ages, in all communities.
We live in a time of political crisis 
when nothing less than American democ-
racy, itself, hangs in the balance. In 1863 
amidst civil war, Abraham Lincoln spoke 
of preserving “government of the people, 
by the people, for the people.” In 1981, 
Ronald Reagan declared, “In the present 
crisis, government is not the solution to 
our problem; government is the problem.” 
There is a straight line from Barry 
Goldwater to Milton Friedman to Ronald 
Reagan to Lee Atwater to Karl Rove to 
Newt Gingrich to Mitch McConnell to 
Donald Trump to January 6, 2021; a 
straight line from concern for the General 
Welfare and the common good to indi-
vidual acquisitiveness and corporate 
aggrandizement; a straight line in terms 
of their positions on labor, the environ-
ment, public health, rule by majority, 
control of the courts, racial justice, 
women’s rights, and voting rights. 
No dearth exists today of thoughtful 
reforms if only we will act with good 
effect. Most needed is that after decades 
of war and climate denial, persistent 
racism and sexism, oppressive income 
inequality, and chronic neglect of the 
nation’s public health, R&D, and infra-
structure, the national government must 
do all it might to demonstrate anew its 
ability make a difference in the lives of 
America’s working and middle class 
families.
“Civilizations die from suicide, not 
by murder,” observes the great British 
historian Arnold J. Toynbee. May we 
heed his warning!
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